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You asked for a brief memo before Conference explaining why 
the state-law basis for the lower courts' decision in Pennhurst does 
not cause problems with No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo. When 
Justice Brennan raised the state law point earlier in Romeo, the 
point he found persuasive was tha~e only claim in Romeo is a 
t( ,, 
damage claim. According to Romeo's counsel at oral argument, the --------damage claim could not have been breought originally as a pendent 
stat~~aw claim because of the then-existing Pa. soverign immunity 
law~he damage claim now would be barred by the state statute of 
limitations. Tr. of Oral Arg. in Romeo, at 36. In contrast, in~~ · 
Pennhurst, state-law did provide a basis for relief. 
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No. 81-2101 ~~./ dissenting i~c:art) ~  
PENNHURST STATE S & HOSPITAL,~ 
v. ~C)lC-
HALDERMAN, ~ Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: (1) Whether the Eleventh Am~dment or comity . ,...... ,, -- - ~ 
concerns prevents a federal court from ordering injunctive relief 
against state officials solely on the basis of a pendent state 
law claim. (2~ Whether it was proper to appoint a special 
master to, at least, "monitor" compliance with court orders. 
FACTS & PROCEEDINGS: This case was commenced by a class of 
retarded citizens alleging that conditions at the Pennhurst State 
School and Hospital were unsanitary, inhumane, and dangerous, and 
that these conditions (1) violated federal constitutional rights, 
Grot..J. \{e '1 I m,4Dr~ .... t ~,.,.( ··..r...-, '}<.¢rh'ons. 1<. r;:. 
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-/ 
violated two federal statutes, and (3) violated state law. 
The DC held that all three of the above basis gave residents a 
IJ \\ 
right to minimally adequate habilitation and were violated by 
existing conditions. The DC ordered sweeping injunctive relief. 
On appeal, CA 3 (en bane) affirmed that mentally retarded 
persons were entitled to appropriate treatment in the least 
restrictive setting under the Developmentally Disabl~Assistance 
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. §6010(12) and (2). The court 
II 
also held that ~tate l aw gave retarded persons a right to 
\\ 
habilitation. The Court did not reach the question of what .. 
rights were guaranteed by the Constitution and Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of of 1973. The DC's injunctive relief was 
modified. 1 
This Court reversed the CA's holding that the 
Developmentally Disabled Act afforded retarded persons a right to 
habilitation in the least restrictive setting. Pennhurst State 
School & Hospital v. Haldermanm, 451 u.s. 1 (1981). Because of 
uncertainty over whether the state law grounds independently 
supported the relief granted, the state law issue, along with the 
·" 
undecided federal and constitutional issues, were remanded for 
reconsideration. .,e 
DECISION BELOW: On remand from this Court, the en bane 
1The DC ordered, inter alia, that Pennurst eventually be 
closed, that suitable community living arrangements be made for 
all Pennhurast residents, and that individual treatment plans be 
developed. The CA deleted the requirement that Pennhurst be 
closed. 
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third circuit unanimously_ held that state law, as recently 
interpreted by t~ e Pa. Su~; , -:;:=- re ~c .. hmi dt, 429 A. 2d 631 I 
(1981), accords ret~~e~t;;._: _!.ight t~ hab.!,litation_ in the 
least restrictive setting. State law, therefore, supported the 
...... ~
CA's earlier judgment and relief. 
TheCA also was unanimous in rejecting petr's argument that -... 
I I '' the Eleventh Amendment barred the court of appeals from granting 
injunctive relief on a pendent state law claim. The court relied 
on Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 u.s. 175 (1909), 
which held that lower federal courts could entertain pendent ...... . 
state law claims not otherwise within their jurisdiction in order 
to implement the longstanding rule that a federal court should 
rely upon a state law interpretation rather than decide a federal 
constitutional question. Sice Siler involved an action against 
state officials, there cannot be an Eleventh Amendment exception 
to the rule regarding pendent claims. 2 
Finally, the Court of Appeals did not reconsider objections 
to the use of a special master as part of the relief ordered. 
Three judges (Garth, Seitz, Hunter) dissented on this point, 
noting JUSTICE WHITE's dissent in Pennhurst labelled the special 
master as a "far-reaching remedy," "inconsistent with [the 
2The court also held that dismissal under the Younger 
doctrine was not required because there was no pending state 
proceeding. Neither was Pullman abstention warranted in light of 
the Pa. Sup. Ct's definitive construction of state law in In re 
Schmidt. "We reject [the] suggestion [that] we should completely 
unglue this several year-old case and start all over so that the 
Penn. Sup. Ct. can tell us again." 
, .. 
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federal statutory] approach." 451 u.s. , at 54-55. 
CONTENTIONS: (1) Eleventh Amendment: Petr argues the 
Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from ordering stgte -
officials to undertake costly and intrusive relief under state ----
law. The central premise of Ex Parte Young, 209 u.s. 123 (1908) -is that state officials cannot evade responsibility when their 
conduct "comes into conflict with the supreme authority of the 
Constitution." 209 u.s. at 159. It does not suggest that federal 
courts may also force state officials to conform their conduct to 
the authority of state law. The CA does not avoid deciding 
constitutional issues in this manner; it simply substitutes an 
Eleventh Amendment issue for a Fourteenth Amendment one. Siler 
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., supra, provides merely that 
the rule of avoiding constitutional decisions "is not departed 
from without important reasons." 213 u.s. at 193. Although Siler 
was a suit against state officials under state law, the case 
involved no "liability which must be paid from public funds in 
the state treasury" and the Eleventh Amendment was neither raised 
nor discussed. Where the relief sought puts the federal court in 
' " 
the business of overhauling state programs, and insisting upon 
appropriations to fund the effort, a different result is 
required. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 651 (1974), allows 
prospective relief not because there is no disruptive efect on ______ __, 
state finances, but because, despite its disrputive effect, it is 
a necessary price for the supremacy of federal law. There is no 





Resps (including the United States, which is a plaintiff-
intervenor), main answer is that Siler, supra, implicitly 
rejected any Eleventh Amendment argument in establishing that 
federal courts have power to decide state law claims against 
state officials. The reasoning of Siler has been frequently 
reaffirmed. E.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Greene, 244 
u.s. 499, 508 (1917); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 u.s. 528, 546-547 
(1974). Moreover, Edelman makes clear that prospective relief 
which has fiscal consequences on the state is not barred. 
Resolving state law issues avoids unnecessary constitutonal 
decisions, while leaving state legislaturtes free to reconsider 
the underlying law. 
Resps also advance a number of secondary arguments: the 
United States is a plaintiff against which the Eleventh Amendment 
cannot be plead; county defendants in the case are not immunized. 
In reply, petrs note that resps rely almost entirely on old 
cases making no mention of the Eleventh Amendment and pre-date 
this Court's limitations on the role of federal courts in 
overseeing state activities. 
: 
(2) Comity: Petr contends that the doctrine of comity 
prevents a federal court from interfering in the management of 
state programs solely on the basis of state law. Federal courts 
, 
must be mindful of the delicacy between federal equitable power 
and state administration of its own law. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 u.s. 
362, 378 (1976). Even when federal rights are at stake, federal 
courts must avoid undue interference with legitimate state 
activity. Younger v. Harris, 401 u.s. 37 (1971); Alabama Public 
-6-
Service comm'n v. Southern Ry Co., 341 . u.s. 341 (1951); Buford v. 
Sun Oil Co., 319 u.s. 315 (1943) •• That is even truer here where 
no federal interests are at stake. Here CA 3 revealed 
"eagerness, not reluctance, to bring federal power to bear on 
local rights." The reluctance to address constitutional 
questions should be less than the reluctance to use state law to 
interfere with state fiscal operations. The effect of the 
decision will be to give federal courts more power over state 
programs and displace the authority of state courts. 3 
Resp Halderman argues that the comity question was not 
argued before the Court of Appeals and should not now be 
considered. The SG in response stresses that the doctrine of 
pendent jurisdiction itself incorporates principles of comity by 
establishing appropriate limitations on the exercise of that 
jurisdiction. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 u.s. 715. No 
further limitation in the name of comity is required. The 
federal claims in this case are non-frivolous, and the applicable 
state law is clear and settled. As long as the federal claims 
are not makeweights designed to invoke jurisdiction, it is 
entirely appropriate to decide the case on state law grounds. 
Resps also argue that comity is better served by deciding state 
law issues open to state revision than by forcing an irrevocable 
federal law judgment upon the state. Finally, the one case 
3Petr suggests that faced with the instant case, the Pa. 
courts might decide the issue differently than In re Schmidt, 
which involved services for a single person. 
. . 
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suggested to be in conflict, Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039 (CA 
5 1980), is entirely consistent. 
(3) Special Master: The use of two special masters, one to 
hold hearings for members of the Resp class, and the other to 
approve and disapprove plans for the residents, is a massive 
displacement of sta te authority over its own institutions. As 
the dissenters in Pennhurst stated, and the majority agreed, 451 
u.s. at 30, n.23, the appointment of special masters was a "far-
reaching remedy" and "the court should not have assumed the task 
of managing Pennhurst." 451 u.s. at 54. Other courts have 
recognized that the appointment of a special master is an 
extraordinary remedy and inappropriate in that it was not the 
least restrictive means of achieving the government's interest. 
United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (CA 6 1981). 
Resps emphasize that the DC has subsequently modified the 
order of relief, specifying that the special master is only to 
"monitor" compliance with the court orders. The special master 
no longer is charged with any planning, organizing or supervising 
obligations. The hearing master only conducts a hearing if 
" 
requested, and such hearings have been relatively rare. It 
. . 
lS 
also suggested that the propriety of a hearing master is not 
properly before the Court because the order establishing the 
hearing master was not appealed and the issue is not addressed by 
the CA. 
Petr replies that the DC's recent order is merely a 
linguistic clarification: "Whether it be called 'monitoring' or 
'supervising' or 'directing,' the fact remains that the Special 
/ 
Master is [placed] at the core of the administration of the state 
program." 
DISCUSSION: This petn raises fundamental questions 
concerning the proper role of federal courts in ordering 
significant injunctive relief on pendent state law claims. All 
~
three issues reflect this general concern. 
First, the Siler decision did not involve the Eleventh 
Amendment. Moreover, subsequent decisions relying on Siler did 
not confront Eleventh Amendment considerations. E.g., Hagans v. 
Lavine, supra. Although Siler stands for the principle that 
state law claims should be resolved prior to constitutional 
issues, that rule normally does not come into conflict with other 
important interests. Here it does. The ~sue appears cleanly 
enough presented: the presence of the United States as a 
plaintiff is important for federal claims, but should not be 
relevant on state causes of action; the presence of some county 
defendants does not legitimize the adjudication and relief 
ordered against state officials. 
Second, the S£mitz_ar~ment is also substantial. The , ~ 
. 
Younger, Pullman, and Buford abstention doctrines reflect these 
interests. These interests are not identical to those accounted 
for in the standards that govern when a federal court should 
decide a pendent state law claim. Gibbs v. United mine Workers, 
supra. Although the Court of Appeals did not discuss comity, it 
did consider whether Younger or Pullman abstention was in order. 
Given that consideration, I believe the comity issue is suitably 
presented for this Court to review. Petr's make too much of the 
-9-
passing statement in the fifth circuit's Smith decision that a 
"violation of state law, without more, will not justify federal 
judicial intervention:" this does not reflect a considered 
position on the fundamental issue presented in this petn. " 
Third, even if there authority is limited to "monitoring" 
compliance with federal court orders, special masters arguably· 
represent an unwarranted interference with state institutions 
when the sole basis for intervention is state law. The hearing 
masters, of course, have broader powers. Although the failure to 
appeal the order establishing hearing masters might bar review 
onf their approrpiateness as a remedy to a federal violation, 
that is not the issue here. The hearing masters were initially 
ordered as relief for a federal violation: because the opinion 
below carried over that relief as appropriate for the state law 
violation, it is open for review whether such relief is 
appropriate when only a state law violation has been found. 
Because of the importance of these issues, I recommend a 
GRANT. 
There are 3 responses, two amicus briefs recommending a 
grant, 4 and a reply. 
June 11, 1982 Singer Opn in petn 
4The amicus brief filed by the State of New York only 
argues the speical master issue. A separate amicus brief on 
behalf of 17 states supports petrs in entirety. 
. _,, } 
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Alexander L. Stevas, Clerk 
United States Supreme Court 
1 First Street N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Mr. Stevas: 
SU PREME COURT, U.S. !-.--- ------
June 17, 1982 
Re: Pennhurst State School and 
Hospital v. Halderman~ No. 81-2101 
(Petition for Certiorari Pending) 
Pending before the Court is a certiorari petition in this case. 
I represent the Halderman respondents. 
The third question presented relates to petitioners' objections 
to appointment of a master to monitor implementation. Appellees 
have explained that the issue is moot due to an intervening district 
court order. 
I received yesterday documents which bear on this issue. The 
master has proposed to the Court a continued budget reduction (44% 
in staff costs over last year), with total monthly requests decreasing 
more than 60% from July to December, 1982 (from $40,217 to $15,191). 
Although the issue is moot and, we feel~ inappropriate for certiorari, 
it seems proper to bring this new information to the Court's attention ' ~ 
because of petitioners' allegations of expense and intrusiveness. The 
fact is that the already limited monitoring role of the master continues 
to diminish. 
Because our in forma pauperis motion is pending~ we have not 
printed this new material. If it should be presented in some way other 
than the nine enclosed copies, please let me know. 
DF/esj 
- Enclosure 
cc: All Counsel 
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL MASTER 
649 5 . HENDERSON ROAD 
2ND FLOOR 
KING OF PRUSSIA. PA 19406 
Honorable Raymond J. Broderick 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
10613 United States Courthouse 
601 Market Street 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 




Dear Judge Broderick: 
(21 Sl 26S-540 1 
(8001 362-0352 
Enclosed is the proposed budget for operation of the Special Master's 
Office for the period July 1 through December 31, 1982. Please note that the 
budget reflects a 35% reduction in staff costs from the current six-month 
period, and a 44% reduction in staff costs budgeted for the six-month period 
a year ago. I would project further reductions in costs for the second half 
of the fiscal year, assuming the Commonwealth continues provision of Court-
Mandated protections relating to IHP review/approval and on-site monitoring 
of community programs. 




cc: All Counsel 
Jeff Stemple 
Sincerely, 
Carla S. Morgan 
Special Master 
OFFICE OF TilE SPEClAL MASTER 
PROPOSED BUDGET 
JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1982 
Personnel: 
































$ 7, 792 
3,500 
2,000 


































CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on ---~rl=~-=--1_'1~,-'~q_g._~---------' I served true and 
correct copies of the foregoing on all parties by mailing them through 
firs t c lass, postage pre-paid mail, to counsel at the following 
addresses: 
Thomas K. Gilhool, Esq. 
Frank Laski, Esq. 
1315 Walnut Street 
16th Floor 
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107 
Thomas M. Kittredge, Esquire 
2107 The Fidelity Building 
Philadelphia, Pa. 19109 
Pauline Cohen, Esquire 
City Solicitor's Office 
1500 Municipal Services Building 
15th Street and JFK Blvd. 
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107 
Carla S. Morgan, Special Master 
649 S. Henderson Road 
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406 
Herbert Newberg, Esquire 
Widener Building, Suite 809 
1339 Chestnut St. 
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107 
Robert Hoffman, Esquire 
Deputy Attorney General 
Department of Justice 
16th Floor 
Strawberry Square 
Harrisburg, Pa. 17120 
Pamela Cohen, Esquire 
Suite 716 
1701 Arch St. 
Philadelphi~, Pa. 19103 
Steve Barrett, Esquire 
Assistant Solicitor 
Montgomery County Courthouse 
Norristown, Pa. 19401 
Adjoa Burrow, Esquire 
U.S. Department of Justice 
lOth and Pennsylvania NW 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
Michael Lottman, Esquire 
2100 Lewis Tower Building 
225 South 15th St. 
Philadelphia, Pa. 19102 
June 17, 1982 
Court ................... . "li•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
PENNHURST STATE SCH. & HOSP. 
vs. 
HALDERMAN 






N POST DI S AFF 
MERITS MOTION I 




N OT VOTI NG 
Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . / . . . . . . . . . . .......... . 0 0 •• 0. 0 0 0 0 0 • • • •• 0 0 •••• 0 •• 0. 0 
Brennan, J .................... / ....................... . 
White, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V/ ....... ......... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '/ . . . . . . . . . . ..... . 
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( .... • ......... . 
Powell, J ...................... : ') . . . . . ( ~~:?. .. .. 
Rehnquist, J ................... ~ . V' . . . ............ . 
Stevens, J ...................... "j . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . 




October 8, 1982 
Court ................... . l-•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 81-2101 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned ................ .. , 19 .. . No. 
Submitted ............... . , 19 .. . Announced ............... . , 19 .. . 
PENNHURST STATE SCH. & HOSP. 
vs. 
HALDERMAN 
dismiss writ of cert as improvidently granted. 
Burger, Ch. J .......... . 
HOLD 
FOR 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
CERT. 
G D 
Stevens, J ........................... . 




ABSENT NOT VOTING 
N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D 







·~ ... " . " ... " . " " . 
. ..................... . 
~ ~ ~ /)~~~~ 4.1 /-1-.r!.J 
~ td.L~)·~ ~~ 
af-W4_ C/1~ ~~ ~~ 
~
· AI! PIA-l~ s~ {t;tif~ ~ 
~tober 8, 1982 Conference §J5 ~_d--K'>AA..tl ~ ~~v{ 
LlSt 3, Sheet 4 Ca.vf. J4A.,c,_ d.~--;;- ... -:~ ~ ~
No. 81-2101~ 41- 1...- ~A~~~ ~t.i.on of Ij.espondents Halderman, 
/_ -r:--:-;-..?t~. to"Dismiss v~rit of Certiorari 
,/ PENNJIURST STATE SCL;j HOSP ,_ ~IlJ'royidently IOta~_ 
v~~ 0U-_u-c-4 ~· 
~ALDERMAN, , et al. ( retarde 
citizens) CA 3 
SUMMARY: Resps (retarded citizens, plaintiffs) argue that because the DC 
(ED Pa., Broderick) recently ordered the phasing out of the Special Master's 
duties in this protracted litigation, this case is no longer appropriate for 
cert review and $ould be dismissed as improvidently granted. 
FACTS: In 1977, resps were granted broad injunctive relief by the DC (ED 
Pa.) which also ap[X)inted a Special Master to supervise the relief. On appeal 
theCA 3 (en bane) affirmed the DC's order in substantial~rt. jl2 F.2d 84 
etJHK'f ~ 
(3rd Cir. 1979). On cert review this Court concluded that theCA 3 had erred 
I{ 
in concluding that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights 
Act (42 u.s.c. §6010) provided substantive rights to resps. It reversed and 
remanded to the CA 3 for consideration of resp's state-law claim as well as 
the undecided federal and constitutional issues. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
~~-.~ -\k~~ ~ ~ ~.\o (4. ~ ·~ 
 ~~~~~ .,rc\ ~ ~ ~.J) 
~'~ ~~ ~.clk 
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On remand the CA 3 (en bane) concluded that state law granted resps a ---- ----- --
right to habilitation in the least restrictive setting. The court also ----------..--
rejected petrs• claim that the Eleventh Amendment prevented federal injunctive 
relief on a pendent state claim. The court did not reconsider petrs• 
objections to the DC's use of a special master.l 673 F.2d 647 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
On June 21, 1982, the Court granted cert on the following questions: ___....... ......, ......... 
(1) Does the Eleventh Amendn~nt prohibit a federal 
court from ordering state officials to undertake 
costly and intrusive relief solely under state law? ----- -
(2) Does the doctrine of comity prevent a federal court 
from interfering in the management of state programs 
solely on the basis of state law? 
(3) Is it a proper exercise of judicial power for federal 
courts to maintain a special master and hearing master 
to supervise decisions of state officials regarding 
proper placement of retarded residents under state law? 
On August 12, 1982, the DC (ED Pa., Broderick), on its own motion, issued a -------
lengthy memorandllin opinion and order modifying its previous orders to the 
extent that the special master's role is to be phased out by December 31, 
1982. Noting that it had always intended that the Special Master's role would 
be temporary, the court observed that in many respects the Special Master was 
duplicating petrs• (defendants) monitoring of conditions at Pennhurst. The 
court also stated that: 
Although the monitoring reports compiled by the Office 
of the Special Master indicate that the conditions at Pennhurst 
have improved, unfortunately there continue to be reports of 
incidents of unnecessary injury to and abuse of residents. See 
Wbestendiek, Pennhurst Probe Finds Patient Abuse, Philadelphia 
Inquirer, August 11, 1982 at 1-A, col. 1. In amending its 
orders to eliminate the Office of the Special Master, it will 
therefore be necessary for this court to establish additional 
safeguards for those retarded persons remaining at Pennhurst. 
This court's Order directing the phasing out of the 
Office of the Special Master should not be interpreted as an 
{M~ication that this court will be less vigilant in insisting 
/r ~ .. at the defendants comply with its Orders. As the defendants 
lin dissent, several judges objected to the use of a special master. 
II lA 
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are now aware, the Court will not hesitate to take appropriate 
remedial action whenever it finds that such action is necessary 
to protect the members of the Pennhurst class. See, ~' 
Memorandum of March 2, 1981; Memorandum of August 25, 1981 (533 
F. supp. at 631); Memorandum of September 11, 1981 (526 F. supp. 
414). (Slip op at 26-27). 
CONTENTIONS: Resps urge that this case is no longer worthy of cert 
review because: (1) The DC's order constitutes "new law" because the Office 
of Special Master will soon no longer exist. (2) Although the DC's actions 
also constitutes new facts, the opinion itself contains heretofore unrevealed 
facts, to wit: The state petrs have made a conscientious effort to review 
"individual habilitation plans" and have further reduced Pennhurst's 
population. (3) The DC's order demonstrates severe retraction of its 
intrusion into petrs' state affairs and petrs' position is now factual in 
nature; the DC's 1978 order, which is the basis of this case, has been 
substantially modified. Thus, petrs' arguments center on the factual 
questions of what power the DC is actually exercising. (4) Although the 
questions presented have "great intellectual, constitutional and political 
interest," this case has substantially changed and there is no basis for cert 
review. 
DISCUSSION: Resps' arguments are not persuasive. In eliminating the , 
role of the special master,2 the DC explicitly stated that it intended to 
m:mitor petrs' efforts to- comply with the court's earlier orders and if 
necessary take remedial action. With removal (at least for the time being) of 
the Special Master, question 3 is less attractive for cert review. However, 
it seems clear that the questions of applicability of the Eleventh Amendment 
and the scope of the DC' s authority over state-law claims remain certworthy. 
The motion to dismiss should therefore be denied. 
No response has been filed. 
9/30/82 Schlueter 
PJC 
2The DC's op1n1on indicates that the •Hearing Master•s• role was 
terminated in February 1982 (Slip op at 14). 
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